The Shapley Value for Stochastic Cooperative Game
In this paper we extend the notion of Shapley value to the stochastic cooperative games. We give the definition of marginal vector to the stochastic cooperative games and we define the Shapley value for this game. Furthermore, we discuss the axioms of the Shapley value and give the proofs of these axioms.
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Modern Applied Science ISSN 1913-1844 (Print) ISSN 1913-1852 (Online)
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